New Trends on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States by Bosco, Giorgio
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 16 | Number 2 Article 3
Fall 1991
New Trends on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
between States
Giorgio Bosco
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Giorgio Bosco, New Trends on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States, 16 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 235 (1991).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol16/iss2/3
New Trends on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This article is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/
ncilj/vol16/iss2/3
New Trends on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
Between States
Giorgio Bosco *
I. Introduction: The Optional Character of International Jurisdiction
Inter-state disputes arise when perceptions that states have re-
garding their relative rights and interests come into conflict. A dis-
pute manifests itself when feuding states disagree "on a point of law
or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two per-
sons."' Although states generally agree that disputes should not be
settled by the use of force, these same states often resort to war when
the conflict cannot be resolved peacefully. The international com-
munity, recognizing that war is not always unavoidable, attempts to
restrict its excesses through various instruments and conventions
loosely described as the "Law of War." 2
The notion of war as often necessary remained in vogue until
1945 when the United Nations was formed and made open to
"peace-loving nations."'3 The peaceful settlement of disputes had al-
ways been available, but international law did not require the use of
"peaceful means." The Hague Conventions of 18994 and 19075 did
not require states to settle their disputes peacefully, and although
the Covenant of the League of Nations made some progress by re-
quiring states to give some time for the dispute to "cool down"
before the states could resort to hostilities, 6 it was the United Na-
tions Charter that marked a watershed in the history of the peaceful
settlement of disputes between states. The Charter prohibits the
threat or use of force, 7 and also imposes an obligation on member
states to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace, security, and justice are not
* Giorgio Bosco is the distinguished ambassador of Italy to Myanmar.
I Mavromattis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
2, at 11 (Aug. 30).
2 See generally H. LEVIE, THE CODE OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (1986).
3 U.N. CHARTER art. 4, para. 1.
4 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land,July 29, 1899,
32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403.
5 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539.
6 LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 12.
7 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
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endangered." As a result, international law now imposes on all
states the obligation to settle their disputes peacefully. 9
The phrase "peaceful settlement of disputes" encompasses a
myriad of dispute settlement mechanisms ranging from informal ne-
gotiations or "good offices" to binding third party intervention. His-
torically, the obligation of states to submit to the judicial or arbitral
settlement of disputes is in constant tension with the notion of state
sovereignty. This Article reviews the evolution of the obligation of
states to peacefully settle their disputes, and carefully details the
present state of international law in this regard. In particular, the
Manila Declaration of 1982, in addition to various proposals made by
Italy, are held up as positive progress in the march toward obligatory
methods of dispute resolution. The Article concludes that recent de-
velopments in the world order may provide an environment in which
states feel less constrained by possibly out-moded norms of absolute
state sovereignty, and may be more willing to sacrifice part of the
same in exchange for a world in which war is not a rule, but rather an
aberration.
II. Consent to Judicial Settlement of Disputes
For international disputes to be resolved by judicial means, the
consent of the state concerned is always necessary because interna-
tional law does not provide full "justice" in the domestic sense of the
term. Within its own territory, the state rules supreme and can im-
pose compulsory jurisdiction on its subjects to achieve the goals of a
well-ordered society. In the international sphere, however, there is
no competent sovereign entity to administer justice. The interna-
tional community has its rules, but its "subjects" retain their sover-
eignty and do not appear before an international judge unless they
have freely accepted to do so.
The principle, affirmed by the Permanent Court of International
Justice (PCIJ), that "[i]t is well established in international law that
no State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes
with other States either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any
other kind of pacific settlement,"l 0 remains valid. However, if a state
systematically refused one means of settlement after another it
would be violating the obligation of good faith contained in the
Charter. '1
8 Id. art. 2, para. 3.
9 See, e.g., N. FEINBERG, THE LEGALITY OF A "STATE OF WAR" AFTER THE CESSATION
OF HOSTILITIES (1961); but cf. Greenwood, The Concept of War in Modern International Law, 36
INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 283 (1987).
10 Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5, at 27 (July 23).
11 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 2.
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III. European Systems of Dispute Settlement
The degree of a nation's acceptance of international jurisdiction
depends in part on historical and ideological factors. Western Euro-
pean countries, for example, share the same ideals of peace, democ-
racy, and freedom, and have the same foundations of juridical
civilization, so it is not surprising that the highest degree of the ac-
ceptance of international jurisdiction can be found among these na-
tions. The twelve member states of the European Community' 2
have by mutual consent given up a portion of their sovereignty, and
accept without exception the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities for all matters relating to the
Treaties of Rome. i 3 The scope of the court's jurisdiction is large,
which necessarily diminishes the defacto or de jure jurisdiction of the
member states' tribunals.
In the field of human rights, the jurisdiction of the European
Court of Human Rights is accepted by all the member states of the
Council of Europe which are signatories of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights. 14 The Convention states that "[t]hejurisdic-
tion of the Court shall, extend to all cases concerning the
interpretation and application of the present Convention which the
High Contracting Parties or the Commission shall refer to it,' ' 5
although "any of the High Contracting Parties may at any time de-
clare that it recognizes as compulsory ipsofacto and without special
agreement the jurisdiction of the Court in all matters concerning the
interpretation and application of the present Convention."'1 6 The
jurisdictional loop is completed by the provision which states that
"[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the decision
of the Court in any case to which they are parties."' 7 In practice, a
tight jurisdictional link has been established among the states that
are signatories to the Convention, since all the contracting parties
now accept the court's jurisdiction. By sacrificing a part of their sov-
ereignty, these contracting states recognize the universal significance
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which-as
enshrined in principle VII of the Helsinki Final Actl 8-is essential
for peace, justice, and the well-being vital to the development of
friendly relations and cooperation among all states.
12 The European Community consists of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United
Kingdom.
13 298 U.N.T.S. 75-78. See L. BROWN & F. JACOBS, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 119-21 (1983).
14 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. 5.
15 Id. art. 45.
16 Id. art. 46(1).
17 Id. art. 53.
18 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1295.
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The Council of Europe served as the framework in the develop-
ment of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of
Disputes, 19 although the jurisdictional link for this convention is not
as tight as that of the European Court of Justice or the European
Court of Human Rights. Any contracting party may declare that it
will not be bound by chapter II relating to conciliation or by chapter
III relating to arbitration.20 Reservations cannot be made, however,
to chapter I, which requires parties to submit all international legal
disputes that may arise to the judgment of the International Court of
Justice, including those concerning: (1) the interpretation of a treaty;
(2) any question of international law; (3) the existence of any fact
which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international
obligation; and (4) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made
for the breach of an international obligation.2' This formulation is
derived from the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 22 but
with a substantial difference. While for U.N. member states the ac-
ceptance of the court's jurisdiction is voluntary,2 3 for the contracting
parties of the European Convention this acceptance is mandatory.2 4
They can only avail themselves of the provision of article 35 of the
Convention, which although not allowing them to escape the court's
jurisdiction altogether, permits them to exclude disputes concerning
particular cases or clearly specified special matters. 25
The Convention supplements judicial settlement by providing
for political enforcement:
If one of the parties to a dispute fails to carry out its obligations
under a decision of the International Court ofJustice or an award of
the Arbitral Tribunal, the other party to the dispute may appeal to
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Should it
deem necessary, the latter, acting by a two-thirds majority of the rep-
resentatives entitled to sit on the Committee, may make recommen-
dations with a view to ensuring compliance with the said decision or
award. 26
IV. The Settlement System of the United Nations
The first important principle of the U.N. dispute settlement sys-
tem is "[t]o bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with
the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settle-
19 European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, April 29, 1957, 320
U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter European Convention].
20 Id. art. 34.
21 Id. art. 1.
22 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 833, art. 36,
para. 2, as annexed to the Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
T.S. No. 993, 1 U.N.T.S. [hereinafter Statute of ICJ]
23 Id.
24 European Convention, supra note 19, art. 1.
25 Id. art. 35, para. 1.
26 Id. art. 39, para. 2.
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ment of international disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace."'27 The principal aim of the Organization, i.e.
the maintenance of international peace and security, is to be
achieved in either of two ways: by collective measures, 28 or by
peaceful settlement of disputes.29 The sentence "in conformity with
the principles of justice and international law," 30 refers only to the
peaceful settlement of disputes, since collective measures are taken
to prevent or repress the use of armed force, and not to reach an
articulate solution of the dispute. At the Conference of Dumbarton
Oaks,3 1 this reference was deemed necessary to avoid recourse to a
solution which might sacrifice the rights of smaller and feebler states
on the altar of a doubtful peace.
The Covenant of the League of Nations also refers to justice and
international law by stating that "the contracting Parties will pro-
mote international co-operation and ... achieve international peace
and security ... by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous re-
spect for all treaty obligations .... -32
A second important principle embodied in the U.N. Charter
states that "[aIll Members shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and secur-
ity, and justice, are not endangered. s33 One weakness in this formu-
lation is that one state may deny that the situation in question is a
"dispute," thereby evading its obligation to settle the contested issue
peacefully. The problem can be addressed by recourse to the princi-
ple of good faith that states must observe,3 4 and by taking into ac-
count the definition of a dispute provided by the PCIJ.3 5
Chapter VI contains the operative provisions of the Charter re-
garding the peaceful settlement of disputes. 36 Except for the obliga-
tion not to resort to violence, the United Nations system of peaceful
settlement hinges on the free choice by the parties of settlement pro-
cedures to be agreed upon, and relies upon other independent inter-
national agreements which institute as between the parties to a
27 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
28 Id. arts. 39-51.
29 Id. arts. 33-38.
30 Id. art. 1, para. 1.
31 See R. HILDEBRAND, DUMBARTON OAKS 237, 240 (1990).
32 LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT preamble.
33 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
34 Id. art. 2, para. 2; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969,
art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339.
35 See Mavromattis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 2, at 11 (Aug. 30). The PCIJ also addressed the subject in the case Relating to Certain
German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia by stating that "[n]ow a difference of opinion does
exist as soon as one of the Governments concerned points out that the attitude adopted by
the other conflicts with its own views." Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia
(Germ. v. Pol.), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 6, at 14 (Aug. 25).
36 U.N. CHARTER arts. 33-38.
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dispute binding or non-binding settlement procedures such as "ne-
gotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial set-
tlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other
peaceful means of their own choice".3 7 With regard to the proce-
dural aspect of the means of settlement, the Security Council may try
to induce the parties-by a non-binding recommendation-either to
choose a peaceful settlement procedure within or without the range
of possibilities listed in article 33, or to "recommend appropriate
procedures or methods of adjustment". 38 With regard to terms of
settlement (i.e. the merits of the dispute), the Security Council, in a
non-binding manner, can recommend to the parties such terms of
settlement as it may consider appropriate.3 9
Unless the parties have already agreed to a means of settlement
to be put in motion by unilateral request before the dispute arises,
such a procedure will have to be established after the dispute is born,
which is difficult if not impossible since the parties are already in
dissension. The danger of the principle of "free choice of means" is
that a state acting in bad faith could adopt a negative attitude and
reject one proposed solution after another. In reality, "free choice"
is only an illusion when a weak state is confronted by a stronger
state, and in some way, this principle of free choice is contrary to the
Charter, especially to the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful
means.
If the concept of the free choice of means has any validity, it is
only if it does not stand alone, meaning that one of the parties, sua
sponte, may set into motion a settlement procedure, even when the
other party resorts to dilatory methods or avoids "meaningful nego-
tiation". Such latitude is provided, for instance, in the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea for certain categories of
disputes.40
The Charter also provides that "[i]n making recommendations
under this Article the Security Council should also take into consid-
eration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the
parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the
provisions of the Statute of the Court."'4 1 This is a reaffirmation of
the court's role as the principal judicial organ of the United Na-
tions.42 Given the synthetic character of the present contribution, we can
only confirm what we tried to demonstrate at length in a recent es-
37 Id. art. 33, para. I.
38 Id. art. 36, para. 1.
39 Id. art. 37, para. 2.
40 See infra notes 116-25 and accompanying text.
41 U.N. CHARTER art. 36, para. 3.
42 Id. art. 92.
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say,43 that the court. is the means of settlement. of legal disputes "par
excellence."
The court has not always commanded the respect of the interna-
tional community. Twenty years ago, widespread concern over the
court's effectiveness prompted General Assembly review of the
court's role,44 but this trend has been reversed: more states of the
Group of 77 have shown confidence in the court by accepting its ju-
risdiction; the Soviet Union modified its attitude vis-a-vis the court;45
and the United States, although compelled after the Nicaragua
Case 46 to withdraw its general acceptance of the court's jurisdic-
tion,47 nevertheless made clear its willingness to submit to the juris-
diction of the court in "appropriate" situations.48
The Charter states that the Statute of the court "forms an inte-
gral part of the present Charter,"' 49 which under article 103 gives the
Statute priority vis-a-vis other international agreements, and ensures
the stable functioning of the court. As the court itself observed, it is
not "an arbitral tribunal constituted by yirtue of a special agreement
between the parties for the purpose of adjudicating on a particular
dispute, but is an institution which has been pre-established by an
international instrument defining its jurisdiction and regulating its
operation." 50 This characteristic of continuing jurisdiction, as op-
posed to one that merely lasts until the resolution of a dispute, al-
lows the court to give continuity to its decisions, thereby establishing
a jurisprudence of international law.
V.' The International Acts of a Universal Character Having the
Settlement of Disputes as a Specific Object
A. Revised General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes
Among the international acts which have the settlement of dis-
putes as a specific object, one of the most important is the Revised
General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
43 G. Bosco, LA SOLUZIONE DELLE CONTROVERSIE GIUR1DICHE INTERNAZIONALI NEL
QUADRO DELLE NAZIONI UNITE (1989).
44 Review of the Role of the International Court of Justice, G.A. Res. 3232, 29 U.N. GAOR
Supp.. (No, 31) at 141, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
45 See infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
46 Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984
I.CJ. 392 (Judgment of Nov. 26).
47 Letter of Oct. 7, 1985 from Secretary of State George P. Shultz to Secretary-Gen-
eral Perez deCuellar, DEP'T. ST. BULL., Jan. 1986, at 67.
48 The United States did in fact bring the ELSI case to a special Chamber of the court
under this policy. Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (Judgment
of July 20). On the ELSI judgment, see Gill, International Decision, AM. J. INT'L L. 249
(1990).
49 U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
50 Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1953 I.C.J. 110, 119 (Preliminary Objection of
Nov. 18).
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adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1949. 5 1
The basic text is the same as that approved in 1928 by the League of
Nations. 52
The General Act institutes three distinct procedures: concilia-
tion, judicial settlement, and arbitration. Conciliation, which is the
first step toward the resolution of disputes of every kind,53 requires
that disputes be submitted to a permanent or special conciliation
commission constituted by the parties to the dispute. 54 Article 11
concerns the attribution to the commission of the power to lay down
its own procedure, "which in any case must provide for both parties
being heard."' 55 At the close of the proceedings the commission
draws up aproces verbal stating either that the parties have come to an
agreement and, if necessary, the terms of the agreement, or that it
has been impossible to effect a settlement. 56
The second procedure provided for in the General Act is the
judicial settlement of disputes. Article 17 refers to disputes in which
the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights,5 7 including
third parties who seek to intervene in the dispute.58 Under this pro-
cedure, parties may either agree to submit the dispute to an arbitral
tribunal, 59 or to bring the dispute before the International Court of
Justice. 60 If arbitration is chosen, the parties will draw up a special
agreement specifying the object of the dispute, "the arbitrators se-
lected, and the procedure to be followed." 6 '
The third procedure relates to political disputes. If the parties
cannot come to an agreement upon the conclusion of the work of the
conciliation commission,6 2 the dispute is brought before a five-mem-
ber arbitral tribunal.6 3 When this provision was adopted in 1928 by
the League of Nations, it was considered a bold and audacious inno-
vation, modelled on the bilateral Locarno treaties.6 4 These treaties
51 Revised General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 71
U.N.T.S. 101-27 (1949) [hereinafter Revised Act]; see Yuen-Li-Liang, Restoration of the Gen-
eral Act, 43 AM.J. INT'L L. 706-09 (1949).
52 See Brierly, The General Act of Geneva, BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L., 119 (1930); Gonsiorowski,
Political Arbitration Under the General Act For the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, 27
AM.J. INT'L L. 469 (1933).
53 Revised Act, supra note 51, at 102, art. 1.
54 Id. at art. 2.; The composition of the commission is dealt with in detail in the arti-
cles that follow.
55 Id. at 108, art. 11.
56 Id. at 110, art. 15.
57 Id. at 110, art. 17.
58 Id. at 120, art. 36.
59 Id. at 110, art. 17. Specific details related to arbitral disputes are contained in
article 18. Id. at 110.
60 Id. at art. 19; This article requires a party to give three months notice. Id.
61 Id. at art. 18.
62 Id. at 112, art. 21.
63 Id. at art. 22.
64 Locarno Treaty, Oct. 16, 1925, reprinted in 4 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN His-
TORY 2385 (1967).
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required all disputes to be submitted first to conciliation. If concilia-
tion proves unsuccessful, the next step is arbitration for "political
disputes" and judicial settlement for "legal disputes." 65
States may adhere to all or any of the three procedures, 66 but
states are permitted to make some reservations 67 including:
(a) Disputes arising out of facts prior to the accession either of the
party making the reservation or of any other party with whom the
said party may have a dispute;
(b) Disputes concerning questions which by international law are
solely within the domestic jurisdiction of States; and
(c) Disputes concerning particular cases or clearly specified sub-
ject-matters, such as territorial status, or disputes falling within
clearly defined categories. 68
The 1949 Act has attained only a limited number of ratifica-
tions, 69 but since the 1928 Geneva Act still might be valid and bind-
ing, it would be in force among nineteen states.7 0
B. Draft of Rules on Arbitral Procedure
Another legal document which addresses the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes is the Draft of Rules on Arbitral Procedure, 7' based
on nine years of work of Special Rapporteur George Scelle and ap-
proved by the International Law Commission of the United Nations
in 1958. The Draft is not a multilateral convention because the polit-
ical situation in 1958 did not permit the transformation of the Draft
into a General Treaty of Arbitration. The General Assembly limited
itself to "taking note" of the Draft, 72 which merely "brought it to the
attention" of member states so that they might consider and use
them when drafting arbitral treaties.
C. Declarations of the United Nations
Two U.N. Declarations, the Declaration on Principles of Interna-
65 Id. at 2387.
66 Revised Act, supra note 51, at 122, art. 38.
67 Id. art. 39(3); If one of party to a dispute has made a reservation, the other parties
may enforce the same reservation against that party. Id.
68 Id. art. 39(2).
69 vor der Heydte, General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1928 and
1949) in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 64 (1981); The Revised General
Act has been signed by only seven states: Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Sweden, and Upper Volta. Id.
70 Id. at 64-65. The General Act is currently in force among Australia, Belgium, Can-
ada, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Switzerland, and Turkey. Spain and
the United Kingdom were once parties to the General Act, but have since denounced it.
F.A.F. von der Heydte writes that, [ilt is evident, therefore, that the question of the cur-
rent validity and binding effect of the General Act of 1928 on the signatory states (who
have not already denounced it) is still a live and open issue." Id. at 65.
71 Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of its Tenth Session, 28 April -
4 July 1958, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/3859 (1958).
72 G.A. Res. 1262, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 53, U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1958).
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tional Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 73 and
the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International
Disputes, 74 also deal with the peaceful settlement of disputes,
although their value as a source of international law is open to
question.75
1. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
The Declaration on Friendly Relations proclaimed that "every
State shall settle its international disputes with other States by peace-
ful means in such a manner that international peace and security and
justice are not endangered.' 76 Although this language tracks the
wording of the U.N. Charter,77 the similarity exists only in form, be-
cause the text does not fulfill the expectations of the delegations of
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and others who sought an amelioration
of the existing system. 78 The Italian proposal is based on the follow-
ing suggestions as alternatives to a world ruled by force:
- Legal disputes should be referred by the parties to the Inter-
national Court of Justice. 79
- General multilateral conventions should provide that dis-
putes relating to the interpretation or application of the con-
vention may be referred by any party to the International
Court of Justice.80
73 G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970)
[hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations]. See generally Rosenstock, The Declaration of
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: a Survey, 65 AM.J. INT'L L. 713-35
(1971).
74 Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, G.A. Res. 37/'10,
37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51), at 261, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1983) [hereinafter Manila
Declaration].
75 Judge Sette Camara of Brazil, for example, declared in 1974 that "[a]ny attempt to
give resolutions and declarations of the Assembly the force of law is tantamount to a sub-
version of the institutional structure of the United Nations." 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1492d
mtg.) at 166, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1492. On the general question, see Schwarzenberger,
The Principles of the U.N. in International Judicial Perspective, 1976 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 307. De-
spite Judge Camara's view, many still believe that U.N. resolutions and declarations can
constitute principles of international law, but only insofar as they reflect the geneial con-
viction of the community of states. This general conviction could not be inferred from the
adoption of a declaration or resolution by consensus. The consensus, indeed, is otien
accompanied by oral statements in which delegations put on record that, were the text to
be approved by a vote, they would have abstained.
76 G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
77 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
78 These expectations are embodied in Special Committee on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States, U.N. Doc.
A/Ac. 125/L.25/Add. I (1966) [hereinafter Italian Proposal].
79 Id. at 2.
80 Id.
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- Every State should accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice.8 1
- Members of the United Nations and United Nations' organs
should continue their efforts to codify and progressively de-
velop international law with a view to strengthening the legal
basis for the judicial settlement of disputes. 82
- The competent organs of the United Nations should avail
themselves 'iore fully of the powers and functions conferred
upon them by the Charter in the field of peaceful settlement,
to ensure that all disputes are settled by means that preserve
not only international peace and security but also justice. 83
This statement can be read as expressing the hope that under
the guidance of the Secretariat, the Special Committee could have
applied itself to improving the existing system. For arbitration, the
matter could have been resumed where the Draft Rules on Arbitral
Procedure had left off in 1958. For judicial settlement and advisory
opinions, the Committee could have undertaken a review of the role
of the ICJ. In addition, a thorough review could have been made of
the reasons why perceptions of the "settlement" role of United Na-
tions (and specifically the court) had progressively declined since the
birth of the United Nations in 1945.
In late 1960s, times were not yet ripe for the development of
new trends on peaceful settlement of disputes. There still existed
the rigid, anachronistic doctrines of state sovereignty, embraced by
the states of the socialist group, while several newly independent
states preferred negotiation, and avoided third-party settlement.8 4
Thus, the principle enunciated in the Declaration on Friendly Rela-
tion did not improve the existing system, but rather, when viewed in
light of the U.N. Charter, constituted a regressive step. The Declara-
tion did not mention the International Court ofJustice, and it was so
reticent on the matter of previous engagements (i.e. compromissory
clauses and arbitration treaties) that it is difficult to conclude that it
seriously encourages them. Oddly enough, the principle's seemingly
unobtrusive fifth paragraph, "[r]ecourse to, or acceptance of a settlement
procedure freely agreed to by States with regard to existing or future disputes to
which they are parties shall not be regarded as incompatible with sovereign
equality," 85 is generally regarded as the Special Committee's only
positive achievement, as it dispels the notion that a state derogates
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 At that time, many delegates of the Group of 77 strongly criticized the ICJ's judg-
ment in the case of South West Africa (Ethiopia v. S. Afr., Liberia v. S. Afr.) 1966 I.C.J. 6,
as being "in favour of a colonial power," and their attitude was of hostility against the
world judicial organ.
85 G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
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from its sovereignty when it agrees to submit future disputes to bind-
ing third-party adjudication.
2. Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of
International Disputes
The Manila Declaration is the result of the work of the Special
Committee that worked on the Charter of the United Nations and on
the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, 6 and consists of
a preamble and nineteen paragraphs, divided into two sections. It
reaffirms some of the fundamental principles of the U.N. Charter,
including the obligations to act in good faith,8 7 to settle disputes
peacefully,88 to refrain from the threat or use of force,89 to refrain
from the intervention in the affairs of any other state,90 to choose
among the various means of peaceful settlement, 91 and, in case of
failure, to refer disputes to the Security Council.92 Some U.N. Char-
ter concepts have been modified, such as the inclusion of the adverb
"exclusively" in connection with the expression "settle international
disputes by peaceful means," 93 and the void left in the Declaration
on Friendly Relations is filled by referring to the obligation under
the U.N. Charter as a source of international law.94
The Manila Declaration also adds to the classic notion of inter-
national law the concept of "generally recognized principles and
rules of contemporary international law."' 95 The delegations responsi-
ble for this new expression believed that it reaffirmed certain funda-
mental principles, including the right of self-determination, the
nonrecognition of illicit territorial acquisitions, and the permanent
sovereignty of states of their natural resources.96
Other new elements include the introduction of good offices
among the means of settlement 97 and the concept of meaningful ne-
gotiation, 98 which is derived from the jurisprudence of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.99 The Manila Declaration also expressly
refers to the ICJ, urging states to recognize or consider recognizing
86 Manila Declaration, supra note 74, at 262.
87 Id. § I, para. 1.
88 Id. § I, para. 2.
89 Id. § I, para. 13.
90 Id. § 1, para. 4.
91 Id. § I, para. 3.
92 Id. § I, para. 7.
93 Id. § 1, para. 2.
94 Id. § I, para. 3.
95 Id. § I, para. 4 (emphasis added).
96 Manila Declaration, supra note 74, at 262.
97 Id. § I, para 5.
98 Id. § I, para. 10.
99 North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Fed. Rep. of Germ. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 1, 46-
47 (§§ 85, 86) (Judgment of Feb. 20).
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the compulsory jurisdiction of the court.' 00 Although the Manila
Declaration does not create new methods of settling international
disputes, it is a comprehensive and positive legal document. Despite
that it is the result of compromise, it is based on a satisfactory com-
mon denominator.
VI. Rules of Dispute Settlement Applicable to Multilateral
Conventions
Disputes often arise over the interpretation or application of
treaties. Such disputes assume greater importance when the text in
question is not just a bilateral treaty, but a multilateral convention.
The point is so relevant that although the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice gives the court no discretionary power over
such intervention,' 0 ' it does allow any state, and not just the parties
to a given dispute, to intervene in the proceedings. 10 2 In theory, the
ICJ is invested with the power to settle disputes. 10 3 In practice, de-
spite the efforts of U.N. delegations to incorporate an appropriate
dispute settlement system into a new convention's preliminary dis-
cussion, the role of the ICJ has been challenged.
Each of the four Law of the Sea Conventions of 1958 included
an Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the compulsory settle-
ment of disputes, which provided that "disputes arising out of the
interpretation or application of any Convention on the Law of the
Sea shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court ofJustice, and may accordingly be brought before the court by
an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to this
Protocol."' 1 4 The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 0 5
and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations' 0 6 contain an Op-
tional Protocol identical to the one contained in the Law of the Sea
Conventions.' 0 7 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties' 08
and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States
and International Organizations,' 0 9 however, contain an annex relat-
ing to conciliation, and allows recourse to the court by only one of
100 Manila Declaration, supra note 74, at 263, § II, para. 5.
101 Statute of ICJ, supra note 22, at art. 62.
102 Id. at art. 63.
103 This hypothesis is buttressed by the U.N. Charter: "[Legal disputes should as a
general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court ofJustice." U.N. CHAR-
TER art. 36, para. 3
104 Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning Compulsory Settlement of Disputes,
April 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 169, 170.
105 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
106 Vienna Convention of Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
107 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 105 at 241; Vienna Con-
vention of Consular Relations, supra note 106 at 487.
108 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
109 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or
Between International Organizations, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.129/15 (Mar. 21, 1986).
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the parties, although only disputes that arise out of the interpreta-
tion and application of articles 53 110 and 64 "1 are covered by this
procedure. The report of the Conciliation Commission is not bind-
ing on the parties under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties.1 12 With respect to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties Between States And International Organizations, the award
of the Arbitral Tribunal is final, is not subject to appeal, and is re-
quired to be complied with by all parties to the dispute. 51 3 Ideally,
recourse to the court should be compulsory for a dispute concerning
the interpretation of any article in part IV.11a Although not ideal, a
minimally acceptable result was reached by requiring that significant
issues 15 be subject to compulsory jurisdiction.
The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea 1 6 was a monumen-
tal event in the history of international law. This enormous Conven-
tion cannot be compared with any other international legal
document, either in its scope or in the efforts devoted to it by so
many nations over so many years.
The dispute settlement system of the Convention is very elabo-
rate, and includes twenty-one articles under part XV. 1 17 Addition-
ally, an entire section is devoted to sea-bed disputes."l 8 There are
nine annexes to the Convention, of which four deal specifically with
the resolution of disputes. Annex V deals with conciliation,"19 annex
VI contains the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea, 120 annex VII addresses arbitration, 12 1 and annex VIII fo-
cuses on special arbitration. 122 Commenting on these various provi-
sions, the late President of the International Court of Justice wrote
that "[u]ndoubtedly, the dispute settlement mechanisms of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea constitute the
pivot upon which rests the equilibrium of the Convention."' 123
110 Article 53 concerns treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general interna-
tional law. See 1155 U.N.T.S. at 347; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.129/15 at 35.
111 Article 64 concerns the emergence of a new peremptory norm of general interna-
tional law. See 1155 U.N.T.S. at 347; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.129/15 at 40.
112 1155 U.N.T.S. at 353.
113 See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.129/15 at 59.
114 Part IV concerns the amendment and modification of treaties. 1155 U.N.T.S. at
341-42.
115 E.g., those connected with the existence of peremptory norms of general interna-
tional law ("jus cogens") U.N. Doc A/CONF.129/15 at 42.
116 THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA at 151, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/122, U.N. Sales No. E.84.V.3 (1982).
117 Id. at 198-201, arts. 279-99.
118 Id. at 186-87, arts. 186-91.
119 Id. at 214.
120 Id. at 215.
121 Id. at 218.
122 Id. at 219.
123 N. Singh, Foreword to G. SINGH, U.N. CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS (1985).
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Article 286 of the Law of the Sea Convention requires disputes
concerning the Convention's interpretation to be submitted at the
request of any part to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction over
the matter. 24 Disputes concerning marine scientific research, fisher-
ies, and the exercise by a coastal state of its sovereign rights are sub-
ject to compulsory jurisdiction with certain exceptions.' 2 5 It is
significant that compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions
could be introduced in a text of such universal character.
VII. New Trends: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe
For almost forty years, two distinct viewpoints existed with re-
spect to the peaceful settlement of disputes: Western States gener-
ally favored third-party settlement and binding adjudication, while
Eastern-bloc nations were decidedly hostile to this type of proce-
dure. Recent developments in Eastern Europe, however, have soft-
ened these hard-line stances.
President Michael Gorbachev, writing in 1987, stated that, "[w]e
must not forget the potentialities of the International Court of Jus-
tice. The General Assembly and the Security Council could apply to
the court more frequently for advisory opinions on controversial
questions of international law. The Court's compulsory jurisdiction
must be recognized by all, at reciprocally agreed conditions."' 1 6 It
also contains truly revolutionary ideas, such as a reconsideration of
the concept of state sovereignty. 127
After showing a willingness to accept the court's compulsory ju-
risdiction, the President of the Supreme Soviet adopted a decree re-
scinding reservations to ICJ jurisdiction over disputes arising from
interpretation and application of U.N. conventions on genocide,
political rights of women, racial discrimination, gender discrimina-
ion, and torture.128
This new attitude has sparked fruitful debate in many forums,
including the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(C.S.C.E.). Before 1989, the peaceful settlement of disputes had
been discussed at length within the Conference, but with unsatisfac-
tory results.
The subject of peaceful settlement disputes is addressed in the
124 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 at 199.
125 Id. at 200.
126 Gorbachev, Realities and Guarantees of a Secure Peace, Pravda September 17, 1987;
This new approach can be discerned by reading the "Soviet Year-Book of International
Law" for 1987, which was reviewed by Hazard in 84 AM. J. IN-r'L L. 303 (1990).
127 The Soviets have stated that "[e]ven long-established concepts of sovereignty must
be reviewed: voluntary self- restriction of some sovereign rights must be encouraged. The
guiding slogan must be: the primacy of law in politics." Hazard, supra note 126, at 303.
128 See id. at 304.
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Fifth Principle of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975,129 approved when
the attitude of the Eastern States was characterized by close-minded-
ness towards any form of third-party settlement. After a paraphrased
reaffirmation of the U.N. Charter, °3 0 the text of the Helsinki Act
does not require the use of any additional means of settlement be-
yond that to which both parties have consented. By the terms of the
Act, the dispute may continue forever, because "[iln the event of fail-
ure to reach a solution by any of the above peaceful means, the par-
ties to a dispute will continue to seek a mutually agreed way to settle
the dispute peacefully."' 13
Subsequent meetings of Conference on Security & Cooperation
in Europe experts at Montreux 32 in 1978 and Athens' 3 3 in 1984 did
not prove to be any more successful. According to the formulation
of the Belgrade mandate, the experts had to "pursue, on the basis of
the Final Act, the examination and elaboration of a generally accept-
able method for the peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at com-
plementing existing methods."' 34 But the results did not live up to
these expectations. The Montreux Document produced only eight
"criteria" for such an elaboration, 135 of which the last four are so
vague so as to preclude interpretation. The Athens Document ad-
mits that "divergent views were expressed and no consensus was
reached on a method."' 13 6 Due to the efforts of Western delegations,
129 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1294. The fifth principle states that parties will settle disputes by
peaceful means, such as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, or other peaceful means; they will try to reach a rapid and equitable solution
based on international law; and will refrain from action which might aggravate the
situation.
130 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
131 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1294 (principle V).
132 The Montreaux document is reprinted in FROM HELSINKI TO MADRID: CONFERENCE
ON SECURrrY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, DOCUMENTS 1973-1983 218 (A. Rotfeld ed.
1983) [hereinafter FROM HELSINKI TO MADRID].
133 See East-West Meeting on Settling Disputes Makes Some Progress, Reuters North
European Service (May 1,1984) [hereinafter Athens Meeting].
'34 DEP'T. ST. BULL., April 1978, at 42, 44.
135 FROM HELSINKI TO MADRID, supra note 132, at 220. The eight criteria are as
follows:
- consistency with the principles and the purposes of the Charter of the
United Nations and the Final Act of Helsinki; especially principle V of the
latter document;
- consistency with sovereign equality of States and the free choice of
means;
- experience and the treaty and diplomatic practice and the views of all the
participating States in this field;
- acceptability to all the participating States irrespective of their political,
economic or social system as well as of their size, geographical location or
level of economic development;
- subsidiarity to existing methods and institutions for the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes;
- flexibility of the method;
- capacity for progressive development of the method.
Id.
136 Athens Meeting, supra note 133.
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it was possible to inject into the Athens document some meaningful
words: "Particular emphasis was put on ways and means of including
a third party element in such a method."' 37
In light of these poor results, the outcome of the last plenary
meeting of the C.S.C.E., held in Vienna on January 15, 1989, which
actually produced a meaningful document is to be welcomed. In the
chapter titled "Questions Relating to Security in Europe," two prin-
ciples dedicated to the peaceful settlement of disputes, are as
follows:
(6) The participating States confirm their commitment to the
principle of peaceful settlement of disputes, convinced that it is an
essential complement to the duty of States to refrain from the threat
or use of force, both being essential factors for the maintenance and
consolidation of peace and security. They express their determina-
tion to pursue continuous efforts to examine and elaborate, on the
basis of the relevant provisions of the Final Act and the Madrid con-
cluding document and taking into account the reports of the meet-
ings of experts in Montreux and Athens, a generally acceptable
method for the peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at comple-
menting existing methods. In this context they accept, in principle, the
mandatory involvement of a third party when a dispute cannot be settled by
other peaceful means.
(7) In order to ensure the progressive implementation of this
commitment, including, as a first step, the mandatory involvement
of a third party in the settlement of certain categories of disputes,
they decide to convene a meeting of experts in Valletta from 15 Jan-
uary to 8 February 1991 to establish a list of such categories and the
related procedures and mechanisms. This list would be subject to
subsequent gradual extension. The meeting will also consider the
possibility of establishing mechanisms for arriving at binding third-
party decisions. 138
The acceptance of mandatory third party involvement in un-
resolved disputes is noteworthy progress. While the Athens Docu-
ment mentioned third party settlement only generically and even
then only at the initiative of a fraction of the delegations, all of the
participants in Vienna accepted in principle the mandatory third
party involvement.
Although determining which disputes are to be settled by third
party involvement is likely to reopen old quarrels such as distin-
guishing between legal and political disputes, and between "justicia-
ble" and "non-justiciable" disputes,' 3 9 it is at least preferable to
137 Id.
138 28 I.L.M. 527, 532-33 (emphasis added).
139 A good attempt to synthesize this distinction is to be found in GOODRICH, HAMBRO
& SIMONs, THE CHARTER OF THE U.N. - COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS (1969):
The attempt to draw a distinction between 'legal' and otherkinds of disputes
is as old as the effort to establish international machinery for pacific settle-
ment. Generally, 'legal' disputes have been considered as those in which the
parties are in dispute over conflicting claims of legal right; their solution is to
be sought in the established rules of international law. In the case of other
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discuss such issues rather than to refuse altogether to' even consider
third-party settlement. Now that attitudes are more open, the
C.S.C.E. has included some interesting initiatives in its program.
The Valletta meeting of experts following the Paris Conference of
November 1990 established a Vienna-based European Center for the
Prevention of Conflicts.' 40
VIII. The U.N. Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of
Disputes
The changed international atmosphere towards dispute settle-
ment has also affected the United Nations. In 1987, the General As-
sembly approved Resolution 42/22,14' ending a decade of
confrontation in the Special Committee Concerning Non-Use of
Force. The Declaration reaffirms that all states must settle their dis-
putes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace
and security, and justice, are not endangered, 42 and invites states to
strengthen international peace and security by referring legal dis-
putes to the International Court of Justice.' 43 The Declaration also
exhorts the General Assembly and the Security Council to request
advisory opinion on any legal question from the court. 144 A year
later the General Assembly approved the "Declaration on the Pre-
vention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May
Threaten International Peace and Security and on the Role of the
United Nations in this Field."' 45
The Declaration is evidence of the new trend. For instance,
while the earlier Manila Declaration affirmed that "all States shall act
in good faith and in conformity with the purposes and principles en-
shrined in the Charter of the United Nations,"' 46 the 1988 Declara-
tion states that "States should act so as to prevent in their
disputes, sometimes referred to as 'political,' the disagreement relates not to
the application of international law but rather to the adequacy of the existing
legal order. The disagreement arises from dissatisfaction with the applicable
rules of law. The factors of 'justice' and 'expediency,' rather than law, gov-
ern the search for a solution.
Id. at 28 1.
140 On the various C.S.C.E. developments, see L. Ferrari Bravo, Peaceful Settlement of
Disputes in Europe in the year 2000 and Beyond, in "LA COMUNITA INTERNAZIONALE", pp. 522-
37 (1990). On the institution of the Center, President Gorbachev, in his speech at the
CSCE summit in Paris, said on November 21, 1990: "Among the innovative decisions... I
would like to mention specially the conflict prevention center as a sort of regulator of the
military and political situation. We predict that it will have a great future and gradually
turn into a kind of 'European security council' having at its disposal efficient means for
extinguishing the flames of any conflict."
141 G.A. Res. 42/22, 42 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 287, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
142 Id. at 288.
143 Id. at 289.
144 Id.
145 G.A. Res. 43/51, 42 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 33) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/43/33 (1988).
146 Manila Declaration, supra note 74, at 262, § I, para. 1.
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international relations the emergence or aggravation of disputes or
situations, in particular by fulfilling in good faith their obligations
under international law."' 47 The 1988 Declaration, by fulfilling obli-
gations under international law as a measure of good faith, is clearly
superior to the Manila Declaration because the principles of the
Charter do not cover all fields of international law.
There is also greater specificity about the role of the Security
Council in the 1988 text. The Manila Declaration, for example,
merely stated that states should "consider making greater use of the
fact-finding capacity of the Security Council in accordance with the
Charter.' 48 The more specific 1988 text states that "the Security
Council should consider sending, at an early stage, fact-finding or
good offices missions or establishing appropriate forms of United
Nations presence, including observers and peacekeeping operations,
as a means of preventing the further deterioration of the dispute or
situation in the areas concerned."' 49
The 1988 Declaration also enhances the role of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. Although the role of the ICJ as the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations is underlined in the Manila Dec-
laration,' 50 the 1988 Declaration makes an express reference. 15 1
Moreover, the 1988 Declaration provides that the General Assembly,
"if it is appropriate for promoting the prevention and removal of
disputes or situations, should consider making use of the provisions
of the Charter concerning the possibility of requesting the Interna-
tional Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal
question."' 52
IX. Conclusion: Toward A Third International Peace Conference at
the Closing of the U.N. Decade of International Law
The movement of the United Nations towards the development
of new and important documents in the field of dispute settlement
culminated in 1989 with Resolution 44/23 of November 17, 1989, on
the United Nations Decade of International Law.' 53 The Resolution
emphasizes the maintenance of "international peace and security,
and to that end to bring about by peaceful means, in conformity with
the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settle-
ment of international disputes or situations which might lead to a
147 G.A. Res. 43/51, 42 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 33) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/43/33 (1988).
148 Manila Declaration, supra note 74, at 263, § I, para. 4(d).
149 G.A. Res. 43/51, 42 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 33) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/43/33 (1988).
150 Manila Declaration, supra note 74, at 263, § II, para. 5.
151 G.A. Res. 43/51, 42 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 33) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/43/33 (1988).
152 Id. A similar recommendation regarding the Security Council is made, but the
Council is urged to take such action "at an early stage" of the dispute or situation.
153 G.A. Res. 44/23, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/23 at 1 (1989).
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breach of the peace."' 54 The Resolution notes that in the next ten
years, the anniversaries of the adoption of important international
legal documents will be celebrated, including the centennial of the
first International Peace Conference, held at The Hague in 1899,
which adopted the Convention of the Pacific Settlement of Interna-
tional Disputes and created the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and
the fiftieth anniversary of the adoption of the Charter of the U.N.
The period of 1990 to 1999 is solemnly declared as the United Na-
tions Decade of International Law, whose main purpose should be:
(a) To promote acceptance of and respect for the principles of
international law;
(b) To promote means and methods for the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes between States, including resort to and full respect
for the International Court of Justice;
(c) To encourage the progressive development of international
law and its codification;
(d) To encourage the teaching, study, dissemination, and
wider appreciation of international law.' 55
It should be noted, and it is to be welcomed, that Resolution
44/23 after expressing the very general aim of promoting the princi-
ples of international law, makes a welcome direct reference to the
International Court of Justice,156 which stands in stark contrast to
the days when court was ignored altogether, or at most referred to in
a very cautious, roundabout way. In addition, in its third operative
paragraph the Resolution considers sponsoring a Third Interna-
tional Peace Conference or other suitable international conference at
the end of the decade. This would represent a worthy celebration of
the Centenary of the First International Peace Conference of 1899.
The decade ahead presents itself under favorable auspices.
States and international organizations, both governmental and non-
governmental, are examining the program for the decade and the
agenda for a 1999 Conference. The idea has already been advanced
that the Conference might achieve success by compiling a list of
those justiciable disputes that were in the past attempted to be
"opted-in". If such a list could be established, it could provide in-
centive to a more widespread use ofjudicial means of settlement and
could increase the inclination of states to accept the ICJ's compul-
sory jurisdiction, albeit with restrictions and reservations. The Ma-
nila Declaration contains an exhortation towards this end, as it is an
appeal to states to manifest by their acceptance of this compulsory
jurisdiction a world governed by law and not by force.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 2.
156 Id.
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